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Abstract
Carbon emissions from deforestation and degradation account for about 20% of global
anthropogenic emissions. Strategies and incentives for reduced emissions from deforestation
and degradation (REDD) have emerged as one of the most active areas in the international
climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC). While the current negotiations focus on a REDD mechanism in developing
countries, it should be recognized that risks of carbon losses from forests occur in all climate
zones and also in industrialized countries. A future climate change agreement would be more
effective if it included all carbon losses and gains from land use in all countries and climate
zones. The REDD mechanism will be an important step towards reducing emissions from land
use change in developing countries, but needs to be followed by steps in other land use systems
and regions. A national approach to REDD and significant coverage globally are needed to deal
with the risk that deforestation and degradation activities are displaced rather than avoided.
Favourable institutional and governance conditions need to be established that guarantee in the
long-term a stable incentive and control system for maintaining forest carbon stocks. Ambitious
emission reductions from deforestation and forest degradation need sustained financial
incentives, which go beyond positive incentives for reduced emissions but also give incentives
for sustainable forest management. Current data limitations need—and can be—overcome in
the coming years to allow accurate accounting of reduced emissions from deforestation and
degradation. A proper application of the conservativeness approach in the REDD context could
allow a simplified reporting of emissions from deforestation in a first phase, consistent with the
already agreed UNFCCC reporting principles.
Keywords: deforestation, forest degradation, climate change, Kyoto Protocol
1. Introduction
Carbon (C) emissions from deforestation and degradation
account for about 20% of global anthropogenic emissions
(IPCC-WGI 2007). Since the eleventh session of the
5 Author to whom any correspondence should be addressed.
Conference of the parties to the United Nations Convention
on climate change (UNFCCC) in December 2005, strategies
and incentives for reduced emissions from deforestation and
degradation (REDD) have emerged as one of the most active
areas in the negotiations. Support for having REDD considered
in the post-2012 climate change regime is building.
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REDD is on the agenda of COP13 in Bali in December
2007, and some agreement is anticipated on actions that
countries might take in the short term in preparation for a
potential REDD instrument.
In this paper we suggest some elements for an effective
long-term implementation of a REDD mechanism under
the UNFCCC and for closing some gaps in forest carbon
accounting. These elements are related both to environmental
and political processes, reflecting some of the most critical
and debated negotiation points. The proposed elements are:
(a) carbon losses from forests; (b) incentives for reducing
emissions and stabilizing and maintaining forest C stocks;
(c) national approach; (d) data availability at national scale;
(e) conservativeness approach for carbon accounting.
2. Carbon losses from forests
While current negotiations in UNFCCC are focused on
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
in developing countries, it should be recognized that risks of
carbon losses from forests are not confined to tropical regions
and developing countries, but they occur in all climate zones
and also in industrialized countries. Care must be taken to
ensure that GHG emissions from land use and land use change
do not increase in all regions.
Deforestation means the conversion of forest to non-forest,
and is associated with land use change. Degradation in general
results from unsustainable management or use of forest land.
Management in UNFCCC terms means any activity of humans
in ecosystems. For the purpose of this paper we define
‘degradation’ as processes leading to a decline of carbon stocks
in ecosystems at landscape level.
Degradation may be abrupt or caused by complex, often
subtle and gradual processes.
There are four major processes by which the carbon stocks
of forests can be changed. These are:
• Start of management in previously unmanaged forests.
• Management and management changes in existing
managed forests.
• Degradation of managed or previously unmanaged forests.
• Deforestation of managed or previously unmanaged
forests.
The initiation of forest management for timber production
in previously unmanaged tropical forests typically depletes
forest biomass C stocks by 30–70% (Sousa et al 2007, Gerwing
and Farias 2000). In Europe, the carbon stocks in forests
managed for timber production have reached a level of 100–
120 t C ha−1, which is below the level observed in unmanaged
national parks (140–300 t C ha−1).
Management interventions can lead to increased carbon
sequestration (carbon ‘sink’) as well as to net carbon losses.
Management practices can be adopted to minimize carbon
losses or increase carbon sequestration. European forestry
provides an example of increased storage of carbon despite
wood extraction. In most European countries forest biomass
has increased over the last decades, because wood extraction
was lower than growth (Ciais et al 2007). As a consequence,
Table 1. 10 Nations with largest primary forest (1000 ha). FAO
(2006).
Nation
Area of primary
forest (1000 ha)
Brazil 415 890
Russian Federation 255 470
Canada 165 424
USA 104 182
Peru 61 065
Columbia 60 728
Indonesia 48 702
Mexico 32 850
Bolivia 29 360
Papua New Guinea 25 211
European forests are net carbon sinks (Janssens et al 2005).
This sink is not only driven by relatively low timber extraction
but also by increased biomass growth due to the young age
structure of European forests, nitrogen deposition (Magnani
et al 2007), elevated concentrations of atmospheric CO2 and
increased temperatures (Wirth et al 2004). However, the
present forest carbon sink is bound to reverse to become a
net source because growing demand for compound wood, pulp
and bioenergy have increased the price for small dimensioned
timber.
Changes in technology and markets will result in a
restructuring of European forest from old age class stands
into young age class stands. For Germany a decrease in the
harvesting rotation period from 120 years to 60 years will
result in a total loss of about 109 m3 of wood over the next
10 years. Converting this amount into carbon units, it is
equivalent to 5% of the German annual fossil fuel emissions.
This is an example how management of land can accelerate
emissions to the atmosphere in an industrialized nation, and
appropriate integrated policies are needed to avoid such an
impact. Comprehensive accounting of the corresponding
carbon stock changes will give the appropriate signal to protect
and enhance carbon reservoirs.
Causes of forest degradation include, among other things,
over-harvesting and unsustainable timber harvesting practices,
excessive extraction of fuel wood for non-commercial
purposes, and increasing forest fire frequencies (Mollicone
et al 2006). Degradation is facilitated by illegal activities and
corruption (Amacher 2006).
Degradation may eventually lead to deforestation. In
a pattern seen in many developing countries, logging
concessions start the process by cutting logging roads that
provide access to people who move into the area in search of
land for agriculture. Unplanned forest clearance occurs where
slash and burn agriculture or other agricultural conversion
takes place. In most tropical soils agriculture can persist only
for a limited number of years after which nutrient deficiencies
and aluminium toxicity set a natural end to human activities.
The abandoned land is often invaded not by forest species but
by aggressive grasses, such as Imperata cylindrica, and this
process is perpetuated particularly where fires are used as a
land management tool or for hunting. In some cases, this land
may be reforested. However, typically it will take decades,
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Table 2. Scenarios for net changes in global forest area at constant rate of deforestation (0.18% annually), and assuming that from 2008 on,
the annual deforestation rate is reduced by 5% or 10% per year. Data derived and projected from FAO (2006).
Deforestation
rate scenario Indicator
Year
2000
Year
2010
Year
2020
% of
forest left
in 2100 Stabilization
Constant
deforestation
rate
Area deforested (1000 ha) 7345 7224 7092 83 <15% of
forest area
after 1000
years
Change in area deforested against previous
year (1000 ha)
−13.33 −13.08
Reduction in annual deforestation (% of area
deforested in 2000)
0 0
5% annual
reduction in
deforestation
rate
Area deforested (1000 ha) 7345 6196 3663 95 95% of forest
area after
200 years
Change in area deforested against previous
year (1000 ha)
−337 −197
Reduction in annual deforestation (% of area
deforested in 2000)
16 50
10% annual
reduction in
deforestation
rate
Area deforested (1000 ha) 7345 5269 1821 97 97% of forest
area after
100 years
Change in area deforested against previous
year (1000 ha)
−594.22 −203.42
Reduction in annual deforestation (% of area
deforested in 2000)
28 75
if not centuries, before such land will reach its original level
of carbon stocks. While degradation and deforestation may
take place very quickly, reforestation and forest rehabilitation
is often quite slow. Thus, the process of degradation and
reforestation is a classic example of the ‘fast out–slow in’
process (Ko¨rner 2003).
The total amount of carbon lost to the atmosphere from
these processes can be large, approximately equivalent to the
carbon bound in the biomass and in part of the soil. Depending
on the fertility of the soil and the climatic conditions this may
range between 150 and 300 t C ha−1 in tropical regions up to
more than 600 t C ha−1 in some temperate forests (WBGU
1998, Schulze 1982).
At present, the reporting obligations under UNFCCC
cover all the major carbon sources and sinks from forests,
including forest degradation. However, under the legally
binding provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, the accounting of
carbon sources and sinks of annex-I parties is mandatory
only for afforestation, reforestation and deforestation activities
(article 3.3). This means that forest degradation may remain
unaccounted for unless the party has voluntarily elected the
forest management activity (article 3.4) and it is accounting
for the whole forest area.
Non-anthropogenic emissions and removals in unmanaged
forests are not necessarily included in the present scope of
emissions inventories reported to the UNFCCC, although these
forests are highly vulnerable to human-induced carbon losses
in the future. This is true particularly for primary forest.
According to available data, the Forest Resources Assessment
(FRA) 2005 (FAO 2006) reports that about 33% of the total
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Figure 1. Scenarios for net changes in forest area at constant rate of
deforestation (0.18% annually: global average for the period
2000–2005, FAO (2006)), and assuming that, from 2008 on, the
annual deforestation rate is reduced by 5% or 10% per year.
forest area can be considered as primary forest. About 50%
of the global primary forests are located in South America,
while the other half is located in the temperate and boreal zone.
Table 1 shows ten nations with the largest area of primary forest
at the global scale. This table puts Brazil at the top followed
by Russia, Canada and the USA before other tropical nations
follow. Thus, responsibility for carbon held in these forests is
not only a matter (and opportunity) for the non-industrialized
3
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countries: a high share of it rests with the industrialized
world.
The GHG emissions caused by forest management, forest
degradation and deforestation are all important to climate
change mitigation efforts. It is quite clear that management,
degradation and deforestation are continuous processes which
refer to managed and unmanaged land. We suggest that a
future climate agreement avoids this complicated, ambiguous
distinction of terms in the future but includes them all in a
broadened perspective on ‘land use and land use change’.
3. Reducing, stabilizing, maintaining
The anticipated REDD mechanism aims at slowing down the
rate at which the remaining primary and managed forests are
degraded and deforested. This would ultimately lead to a
stabilization of the remaining forest area. The necessary level
of ambition is determined by two elements: how much forest
would be left at stabilization? How fast can the forest area and
carbon stocks be stabilized?
The extent of C losses by degradation cannot be quantified
at the global level. Therefore the following scenarios only
consider deforestation. The conclusions made from the
scenarios, however, are equally applicable to degradation. Let
us assume simple generic deforestation scenarios in which
forest area monotonically declines at fixed reduction rates in
deforestation. Net change in forest area is taken as proxy due to
large uncertainties in forest C stocks (section 5). However, the
ultimate target commodity under the UNFCCC is reduced CO2
emission. The deforestation scenarios could be interpreted as a
global goals for REDD or a global market situation in which
countries successively join. Continuing deforestation at its
present rate would marginally reduce the annual deforested
area relative to historical forest area losses but would fall
far short of halting deforestation in the long-term (table 2,
figure 1). Reducing the global deforestation rate annually by
5% after 2008 (table 2, figure 1) would allow stabilization of
the global forest area at 95% of its present extent (table 2,
figure 1).
Following our assumption of constantly declining rates of
deforestation most of the reduction in forest loss will occur in
the first few years. This is in line with the success stories from,
for example, Costa Rica and India. Brazil recently reduced
deforestation by half by new policies. Slowing down emissions
from deforestation may be a ‘fast, easy and cost-effective’ task
at the beginning and much faster than in our ‘10% annual
reduction’ scenario illustrated in table 2 and figure 1. Reducing
the global deforestation rate annually by 10% after 2008 would
allow reduction of deforestation emissions by 75% by 2020
(table 2, figure 1).
We demonstrate with our simple scenarios that the present
REDD mechanism sets a perverse incentive for countries to
continue deforestation at only slightly reduced rates. The
reason is the necessity to match implementation costs with the
flow of positive incentives from REDD. Unlike the accounting
of assigned amount units under the Kyoto Protocol, the REDD
mechanism is set to credit emission reductions. Hence the
overall volume of positive incentives achievable by a country
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Figure 2. Scenarios for positive incentives from REDD at various
ambition levels for a hypothetical country. Panel (a) shows the
fraction of positive incentives from REDD obtainable in each
consecutive five-year application periods. Panel (b) shows the
cumulative fraction of positive incentives from REDD obtainable in
consecutive five-year application periods.
is limited to its past emission level. The country needs to
decide whether to receive positive incentives now or later, fast
or slow, and will try to adjust the likely flow of payments
with its anticipated flow of costs for REDD. We use the area
not deforested as compared to the previous year as a proxy
for emission reductions. High emission reduction rates at the
start produce a large volume of emission reductions in the first
years followed by a dramatic decline in additional emission
reduction in consecutive periods (figure 2). However, long-
term success in reducing forest emissions requires continuous
sustained policies and measures and adequate resources. In
addition, after the less costly options for reducing deforestation
and forest degradation are implemented, the more difficult and
costly ones—those representing higher opportunity costs—
will be left. Therefore, it is expected that the costs per unit of
reduced emissions will increase over time. The real challenge
for REDD will be to ensure that the reduction of emissions
from forests will be durable; that there will be no tendency to
reverse the process. For this, it will be essential that, in addition
to counteracting pressures leading to deforestation, sustainable
forest management systems are put in place. Without this long-
term perspective, the contribution of a REDD mechanism will
ultimately be ineffective for climate change mitigation.
Any consistent reduction process must quite soon turn
from a short reduction phase to a long stabilizing phase
(see figures 1 and 2). Reduction and stabilization are two
4
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consecutive periods of the same track towards the conservation
of the existing forest and carbon pools and thus the mitigation
of climate change. The two phases need to be incorporated
from the very beginning in REDD incentive schemes. The
main challenge will be to modulate the incentives in relation
to the different national circumstances and different stages
(reduction and stabilization) of the emission reduction process.
Incentives targeted at compensating reduced emissions
help to start activities, but rapidly decline over time, in
particular when the start is ambitious. Other incentives are
needed, e.g. payments for environmental services (Vanclay
2005), or a different target commodity under the UNFCCC,
such as the conservation of C stocks, or a combination. These
other incentives do not fit into the current emission trading
schemes.
4. Leakage and liability
Geist and Lambin (2002) conclude in their study on
deforestation drivers: ‘Tropical forest decline is determined
by different combinations of various proximate causes
and underlying driving forces in varying geographical and
historical contexts’. Each country has a unique set of drivers of
deforestation and forest degradation and of appropriate policies
and approaches to address them. Deforestation can be slowed
down only if it is addressed through a comprehensive set
of policies and measures that are compatible with the socio-
cultural, economic, political and ecological conditions of the
country.
Following the existing Kyoto Protocol examples, two
different options could be followed in dealing with emission
reduction for a REDD mechanism: the national approach and
a project-based mechanism. It is worth noting that, whilst
the national approach may have projects embedded in it, a
project-based approach would almost certainly not provide
for national coverage. From a technical standpoint, leakage
is the main factor that makes a national approach preferable
to a project-based one. This is because, in the absence of
additional positive incentives to counteract deforestation and
forest degradation outside the project area, the project activities
could easily shift human pressures from the project areas
to other areas, causing additional environmental and socio-
economic impacts. Discounting environmental impacts on
forest areas outside the project area would probably mean
that project participants would not be able to claim for any
positive incentives since leakage counteract the reduction in
emissions within the project area. In practice, the impossibility
of a project-based mechanism to guarantee that it results in
an overall reduction of emissions from a country’s forests
makes it unsuitable for responding to the final goal of a REDD
mechanism: reducing emission from forest in developing
countries.
A second important factor to be considered is the liability
of subjects acting in the mechanism. While a no-lose
target could be agreed for a national approach mechanism
since a negative performance in a certain accounting period
(i.e. increase in emission from deforestation in the accounted
land) could be discounted in the greenhouse gas balance of the
following periods, for the project approach it should not be.
Indeed, in the case of an increase in emission from the project
area the related debits should be addressed on time by project
participants since there are no guarantees that the project will
act in the following accounting periods and so that the debits
could be compensated in the future.
Anyway, the national approach in itself does not solve the
problem of the displacement of deforestation from one country
to another country. In this respect the REDD mechanism
should include also some rules to guarantee, in some degree,
a broad participation and a common liability. An option, the
global baseline, has been already discussed in a previous paper
(Mollicone et al 2006), but most probably a more agreeable
solution could be the threshold rule as was used for the
entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol (that rule established
thresholds in term of total emissions and number of countries).
This approach may minimize leakage, enforce liability and
overall ensure that REDD will result in real mitigation effort.
Deforestation and degradation are correlated with corrup-
tion and governance failure (Smith et al 2003, Vanclay 2005).
A REDD mechanism should include incentives for good gov-
ernance, or even make good governance an eligibility criterion
for the participation of countries. Historical forest degradation
cannot be quantified yet.
5. National data availability
The global Forest Resources Assessment 2005 of the Food and
Agriculture Organization provides a global dataset on forest
resources, including growing stock, biomass and carbon stock,
based on country submissions to the FAO. The results of this
data compilation effort provide useful insights into the status
of availability and accuracy of national data on forest carbon
(Marklund and Schoene 2006). The conclusions include the
following:
• The quality and reliability of country data are highly
variable.
• The majority of countries lacks good forest inventory data;
they rely on use of conversion factors and default values.
• There is weak trend data on growing stock; most countries
do not have inventory data at two or more points in time.
• Reporting on carbon in soil and litter is limited.
Out of 229 countries and territories, 143 reported on carbon
in biomass, and only 50 reported on carbon in litter and soil.
Of 147 countries reporting time series on growing stock, 83
countries have only one figure on growing stock per hectare.
Thirty-four countries provided no data, 38% of countries
provided data at IPCC Tier 1 level (indicating an absence of
country-specific data), 22 at Tier 2 level and six at Tier 3 level.
Clearly, important gaps need to be addressed in order to make
better estimates of forest carbon stocks.
The situation is particularly limiting in developing, or
non-annex 1 countries, particularly in the smaller and less
forested countries. As developing countries account for the
large majority of deforestation globally (as indicated by the
reduction in forest areas reported for FRA 2005, even if the
carbon densities are uncertain), they have most to offer to
5
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Table 3. Example of how ignoring a carbon pool may produce a conservative estimate of reduced emissions from deforestation. The
reference level might be assessed on the basis of historical emissions. (1) Complete estimate, including the soil pool; (2) incomplete estimate,
as the soil pool is missing. The latter estimate of reduced emissions is not accurate, but is conservative.
Carbon stock change Emissions
(t C ha−1 deforested) (area deforested × C stock change, t C × 103)
Area deforested
(ha × 103)
Aboveground
biomass Soil
Aboveground
biomass + soil
Only aboveground
biomass (no soil)
Reference level 10 100 50 1500 1000
Assessment period 5 100 50 750 500
Reduction of emissions
(reference level—assessment period, t C × 103)
750 (1) 500 (2)
efforts to reduce the rate of greenhouse gas emissions from
forests. These countries would also have the most to gain from
a potential REDD mechanism that would provide financial
incentives to countries reducing their emissions from forests.
Many, if not most, developing countries, however, will need
to expend considerable effort in improving their forest data
collection and management systems if they are to be able to
benefit from an eventual UNFCCC REDD instrument.
FAO has a programme to support national forest assess-
ment programmes (http://www.fao.org/forestry/site/33791/en/
gtm/). The experience shows that, within two to three years,
a country may establish a forest monitoring system to assess
the present status of forest resources, their management and
uses. Within an additional three to four years, e.g. through
support to a readiness phase, countries will be able to report
to the UNFCCC Secretariat on emissions from forests accord-
ing to the 2006 IPCC guidelines for national greenhouse gas
inventories for agriculture, forestry and other land use (IPCC
AFOLU Guidelines).
While data on forest carbon pools collected in the present
may, with some assumptions, be used to estimate forest carbon
content in forests in the past, there are more limitations
on assessing historical deforestation rates connected to the
availability of satellite earth observation data. There are only a
few years for which there are global sets of earth observation
data that can be used for assessing forest cover in tropical areas
(i.e. the years 1975, 1990 and 2000). This means that accurate
forest cover trend analyses are available for only a few points
in time since 1975 for most countries.
6. Conservativeness approach for carbon accounting
To be fully and appropriately assessed, carbon sources and
sinks in forest land require national monitoring capabilities.
This represents a challenge even for industrialized countries.
These technical constraints have been often used as an
argument not to include these processes (or to include
them only partially) in climate change mitigation efforts.
Nevertheless, we point here at a practicable and easy way out
of this.
Any mechanism of positive incentives for REDD will
require robust estimates, both for the amount of deforested
areas and for the carbon stocks in those areas. On the
other hand, it requires a broad participation from developing
countries to reduce the risk of emissions displacement from
one country to another. Under the current UNFCCC reporting
system, ‘estimates of emissions should be accurate in the sense
that they are systematically neither over nor under the true
value, so far as can be judged, and that uncertainties are
reduced so far as is practicable’ (UNFCCC 2003). Whilst
the capacity for monitoring the amount of deforested area is
rapidly improving, in many developing countries the scarcity
of reliable data on carbon stocks, especially for soil (FAO
2006), suggests that the overall estimates of emissions are
not likely to be accurate. However, a simple approach—
already accepted for the accounting of emissions under
the Kyoto Protocol—may greatly simplify the requirements
needed to get defensible estimates of reduced emissions. It
is the ‘conservativeness approach’ (UNFCCC 2006). In the
REDD context, conservativeness means that—when accuracy
cannot be achieved—the reduction of emissions should not
be overestimated. In practice, conservative estimates of
carbon stock changes could require considerably less data
than accurate estimates. For example, provided that the
area deforested is reduced as compared to a reference level,
if emissions from a carbon pool (e.g. the soil) are not
reported, the resulting estimates of reduced emissions will not
be accurate, but will be conservative (table 3).
The approach of conservativeness would help preserve
the ‘climate integrity’ of any REDD mechanism, providing
a win–win option. On the one hand, it guarantees that
the economic incentives are not leading to ‘hot air’, thus
helping to convince policy makers, donors and investors in
industrialized countries. On the other hand, it helps a broad
participation from developing countries, allowing them to join
the mechanism even if they cannot provide accurate estimates
for all carbon pools.
Furthermore, such an approach would provide a clear
incentive for increasing the quality of the reporting: indeed,
more complete and accurate reporting (e.g. including all carbon
pools) would increase the estimate of reduced emissions,
potentially allowing one to claim for more incentives. If the
future REDD reporting rules will fix some minimum quality
standard and will provide some guidance on the expected
accuracy and cost of the different estimation methodologies,
there could be envisaged a system in which—provided that
conservativeness is satisfied—parties are allowed to choose for
themselves what estimate/report and at which tier, depending
on their own cost–benefit analysis. If a REDD mechanism
starts with conservativeness, accuracy will follow.
6
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7. Conclusions
(1) Carbon losses from deforestation and degradation repre-
sent a significant fraction of total carbon stock changes
caused by mankind in developing and industrialized coun-
tries.
(2) Efforts to mitigate climate change may be delayed or even
unsuccessful if land use and land use change in general,
and deforestation in particular, are not addressed.
(3) A future climate change agreement would be more
effective if it included all carbon losses and gains from
land use in all countries and climate zones. The REDD
mechanism will be an important step towards reducing
emissions from land use change in developing countries,
but needs to be followed by steps in other land use systems
and regions.
(4) A national approach and significant coverage globally are
needed to deal with the risk of leakage.
(5) Favourable institutional and governance conditions need
to be established that guarantee in the long term a stable
incentive and control system for maintaining forest carbon
stocks.
(6) Ambitious emission reductions from deforestation and
forest degradation need sustained financial incentives,
which go beyond positive incentives for reduced emissions
but also give incentives for sustainable forest management.
(7) Current data limitations need—and can be—overcome in
the next few years to allow accurate accounting of reduced
emissions from deforestation and degradation.
(8) A proper application of the conservativeness approach in
the REDD context could allow a simplified reporting of
emissions from deforestation in a first phase, consistent
with the already agreed UNFCCC reporting principles.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper may not in any
circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the
European Commission.
References
Amacher G S 2006 Corruption: a challenge for economists interested
in forest policy design J. Forest Econ. 12 85–9
Ciais P, Nabuurs G J, Cescatti A, Piao S L, Lemaire G, Schulze E D,
Liski J, Buriaud O, Zaehle S and Schelhaas J 2007 European
forests: when sponges make hard wood, submitted
FAO 2006 Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005 Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Geist H J and Lambin E 2002 Proximate causes and underlying
driving forces of tropical deforestation BioScience 52 143–50
Gerwing J J and Farias D L 2000 Integrating liana abundance and
forest stature into an estimate of total aboveground biomass for
an eastern Amazonian forest J. Tropical Ecol. 16 327–35
IPCC-WGI 2007 Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
Janssens I A et al 2005 The carbon budget of terrestrial ecosystems at
country-scale—a European case study Biogeosciences 2 15–26
Ko¨rner C H 2003 Slow in, rapid out—carbon flux studies and Kyoto
targets Science 301 1242
Magnani F et al 2007 The human footprint in the carbon cycle of
temperate and boreal forests Nature 447 848–50
Marklund L and Schoene D 2006 Global assessment of growing
stock, biomass and carbon stock Forest Resources Assessment
Working Paper 106 (ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/ah849e/
ah849e00.pdf)
Mollicone D, Eva H and Achard F 2006 Human role in Russian wild
fires Nature 440 436–7
Schulze E-D 1982 Plant life forms and their carbon, water and
nutrient relations Physiological Plant Ecology II. Water
Relations and Photosynthetic Productivity (Encyclopedia of
Plant Physiology vol 12B) ed O L Lange, P S Nobel,
C B Osmond and H Ziegler (Berlin: Springer) pp 615–76
Smith R J, Muir R D J, Walpole M J, Balmford A and
Leader-Williams N 2003 Governance and the loss of
biodiversity Nature 426 67–70
Sousa C, Sales M H, Monteiro A L and Mollicone D 2007
Monitoring forest degradation: approaches and challenges to
REDD Environ. Res. Lett. submitted
UNFCCC 2003 Guidelines for the preparation of national
communications by parties included in annex I to the
convention, part I: UNFCCC reporting guidelines on annual
inventories FCCC/CP/2002/8 Decision 18/CP.8
UNFCCC 2006 Good practice guidance and adjustments under
Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Kyoto Protocol
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 Decision 20/CMP.1
Vanclay J K 2005 Deforestation: correlations, possible causes and
some implications Int. Forest Rev. 7 278–93
WBGU 1998 The accounting of biological sinks and sources under
the Kyoto protocol: a step forward or backwards for global
environmental protection? Special Report, Bremerhaven
German Advisory Council on Global Change, p 75
Wirth C, Schulze E D, Schwalbe G, Tomczyk S, Weber G and
Weller E 2004 Dynamik der Kohlenstoffvorra¨te in den Wa¨ldern
Thu¨ringens. Mitteilungen der Thu¨ringer Landesanstalt fu¨r Wald,
Jagd und Fischerei 23, p 308
7
